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1. Introduction 
The expected utility (EU) from the act of voting in a large election is infinitesimal because the 
probability of a single  vote being decisive (or  pivotal) is infinitesimal. Consequently, the 
rational voter hypothesis first developed by Downs (1957) has been unable to explain why 
rational people vote to bring about the victory of their preferred candidate if the act of voting 
has  a  positive  cost1:  the  expected  benefit  from  voting  would  be  of  a  smaller  order  of 
magnitude than the cost. People should never vote on rational grounds unless they have a taste 
for casting their ballot into an urn. Fortunately for democracy, few citizens never vote even 
though many occasionally abstain. This is the well-known ‘paradox of not voting’ (PNV).  
In  his  review,  Feddersen  (2004)  notes  that  previous  attempts  to  solve  this  paradox  have 
concentrated on the game-theoretic approach by lack of a canonical rational choice model of 
voting. However, embedding the decision to vote within a game (Ledyard 1984, Palfrey and 
Rosenthal 1983) has not yielded a convincing solution to the PNV so far when uncertainty 
about the actual number of voters is introduced (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1985), or even when 
voters are structured in groups of supporters of the candidates who will cast their ballot if and 
only if they receive a consumption benefit from doing so (see Feddersen 2004 for references).  
This paper revisits the decision-theoretic approach to the PNV by considering whether it can 
be explained in a non-EU framework2. This is a rather natural idea since EU has raised many 
other paradoxes of decision under risk and uncertainty, like Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, 
which can be solved by non-EU theories (see the review of Starmer (2000)). Two prominent 
non-EU theories which have fared well in other risky contexts are prospect theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979) and rank-dependent EU (Quiggin 1982) on one hand, or regret theory 
(Bell  1982;  Loomes  and  Sudgen  1982)  on  the  other  hand.  For  our  present  purpose,  the 
distinguishing  feature  of  these  theories  is  that  prospect  theory  and  rank-dependent  EU 
transform  probabilities  while  regret  theory  modifies  the  utility  function.  A  recent 
development, called third-generation prospect theory (Schmidt et al., 2008), assumes that the 
reference point could be a risky prospect and has some common points with regret theory. 
In short, amongst the possible explanations of the PNV, as the taste of voting or the civil duty 
(see Mueller, 2003, chapter14, for a survey), we focus on the traditional case where a citizen 
vote to bring about the victory of her preferred candidate, given that she knows that this act 
has a positive cost and the probability of being decisive is infinitesimal.  
The paper proceeds as follows. We elicit necessary conditions for voting in section 2. Section 
3 shows that prospect and regret theories cannot solve the PNV because they don’t respect 
these  two  conditions  together.  However,  an  amended  version  of  third-generation  prospect 
theory is consistent with the PNV. Concluding remarks appear in section 4. 
 
 
2. Necessary conditions for voting 
Let us briefly set up the notations that will be used here. The act of voting in a two-candidate 
election  is  viewed  as  a  rational  individual  choice  under  uncertainty.  It  will  be  assumed 
throughout that individual voters have no power to form coalitions, an assumption that can be 
taken  as  a  definition  of  a  “large”  election.  This  is  the  “one  vote-one  voice”  motto  of 
                                                           
1 Without denying the fact that people may enjoy some aspects of voting, we rule out assumptions of a negative 
cost of voting due to a taste for voting (Riker and Ordeshook 1968), or to a taste for participation to collective 
actions, as in expressive voting theory (e.g., Schuessler 2000).  
2 Chew and Konrad (1998) is an exception for calling upon uncertainty aversion to justify bandwagon effects on 
voting behaviour. However, they don’t address the question of why people decide to vote. 
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democracy. If the individual votes, he bears a cost, noted C in utility terms. We set up a level 
B  (benefit)  for  the  difference  in  utilities  from  the  policies  of  the  two  candidates.  The 
individual may vote (V) or abstain (A), and his preferred candidate can be elected or not. This 
leads to four possible utility levels. The cost is positive, but typically small in comparison 
with the benefit from winning the election, so that: 
  B C B C < - < < - 0   (1) 
Obviously, if decisions to vote had no influence whatsoever on the electoral outcome, the 
individual would never vote because A would then strictly dominate V. Thus rational citizens 
who bear a cost of voting must perceive a positive probability of casting a decisive ballot in 
order to decide to vote. No citizen can be persuaded to vote if there is a cost to vote unless she 
perceives that the election outcome partly depends on her own participation. Thus, voting 
should be framed as an act of political participation under individual control which can turn 
defeat into victory. Consequently, the decision problem is better described by table I, which 
assumes that three states of the world are distinguished. The individual’s act of voting or 
abstention has no influence on the electoral outcome in state 1 (victory if I don’t vote, with 
probability q) and in state 2 (defeat if I don’t vote), but it is decisive in the third state (voting 
is responsible for victory and abstention is responsible for defeat, with probability e). Thus, A 
no longer dominates V. Potential voters will reason: ‘If I do not vote, I can always save the 
cost of voting C but there is a possibility that I lose the (much) greater benefit of victory 
C B -  if my vote were to be decisive’. It is worth noticing that democratic values emphasize 
the  notion  that  individual  political  participation  is  important  and  each  vote  matters3.  The 
argument stating that each voter perceives that her ballot might be decisive must be quite 
persuasive since it is commonly found that rather large majorities of voters do vote.  
 
Table I Gambling between vote (V) and abstention (A) 
  The vote is not decisive    The vote is decisive 
  Victory: State 1 
Pr state 1 = q               
Defeat: State 2  
Pr[state 2] =1-q-e     
  State 3 
Pr[state 3] =e 
A  B  0    0 
V  C B -   C -     C B -  
 
However, the decisiveness of a single vote is so unlikely in a large election that it will not 
persuade many to vote if there is a cost to vote. Several attempts have been made to evaluate 
such  probabilitye4.  For  instance,  Owen  and  Grofman  (1984)  provide  the  following 
approximation formula: 
                                                           
3 An experiment by Blais and Young (1999) confirms that an emphasis on the economic reasons for not voting 
during the 1993 Canadian federal election campaign had a negative influence on turnout for a group of students 
(and potential voters) by inhibiting their perception of the positive reasons for voting. Framing matters.  
4 Given all other votes, a single vote will change the electoral outcome if and only if either one of the two 
conditions below occurs when all other ballots: 
(1) are evenly split between the candidates (probabilitye1) so that an additional vote determines the winner. 
This occurs when there are an odd number of voters; 
(2)  give  victory  to  one’s  less  preferred  candidate  by  a  margin  of  one  vote.  An  additional  vote  for  this 
candidate  determines  a  draw,  and  the  electoral  outcome  is  eventually  decided  by  an  arbitrary  criterion 
(probability e2 1 2
1
e » ). This occurs when there is an even number of voters. 
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in which p is the expected percentage score for one’s preferred candidate and N is the number 
of potential non-indifferent voters. The difference  5 . 0 - p  measures the expected “closeness” 
of an election. The probability that any single vote be decisive sharply declines with the size 
of the electorate and with the numerical imbalance between the two competing factions (the 
inverse of closeness). It becomes infinitesimal in large elections. For example, even under 
extremely tight competition ( 5 . 0 » p ), e  is only 0.019% with 10 Million voters. 
Myerson (2000) gave an alternative expression for the probability a vote is pivotal. Fischer 
(1999) pointed out that e is sensitive to the approximation formula being used. This brief 
discussion suggests that the estimates of e are imprecise and that the only thing we know for 
sure of this probability is that it should be infinitesimal in large elections. 
EU theory fails to predict that many people vote because  C B < . e  if e  is infinitesimal. Thus, 
potential voters must greatly overestimate the decisiveness of their own ballot in order to 
decide to vote. 
To summarize the above discussion, any rational solution to the PNV implies two necessary 
conditions: 
(NC1) Rational citizens who bear a cost of voting must perceive voting as an individual act of 
political participation which can turn defeat into victory. Thus the decision to vote or abstain 
is framed in table I as a choice among two acts with three (voter-specific) states of the world.  
(NC2) The  perceived  probability  of  casting  a  decisive  ballot  must  be  substantially 
overestimated in comparison withe . 
Clearly, EU fails on both accounts. Framing the decisive state does not make a difference on 
preferences5: only victory or defeat matter, notwithstanding whatever caused them (NC1); and 
probabilities of victory and defeat are not distorted (NC2). 
Not surprisingly, the celebrated solution proposed by Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) exactly 
meets the two conditions: voting and abstention are framed as actions, and the probability of 
casting a decisive ballot is substantially overestimated. This arises from their assumption that 
uncertainty about the decisiveness of one’s vote is total so that individuals are unable to 
calculate  probabilities  and  simply  adopt  Minimax-regret  decisions  that  do  not  require 
probability judgments. Potential voters decide to vote if and only if the regret of bearing an 
avoidable cost  C  (states 1 and 2 if V) is smaller than the regret of feeling responsible for 
defeat  C B -   (state  3  if  A).  Evidently,  the  calculation  of  regret  implies  the  framing  of  a 
decisive vote, as shown by table II. Furthermore, the decision rule under total uncertainty 
implies that the two states are given equal weights, which greatly overestimates the likelihood 
of a decisive vote. In our view, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) capture essential components of a 
solution to the PNV. However, they go too far in saying that voters have no information at all 
to  make  their  own  subjective  evaluation.  It  would  be  more  accurate  to  say  that  voters’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
We can use 






e e e e » + =  to assess the subjective probability that an individual's vote decide the victory 
of his preferred candidate (Mueller 2003, chap. 14). 
 
5  With  the  “act  of  political  participation  frame”  depicted  by  table  1,  an  individual  will  vote  if 
( ) ( ) ( ) . ) ( ) )( 1 ( ) ( qB C B q C q C B q A EU V EU > - + º - - - + - + Û > e e e   Under  EU,  this  condition  for 
voting would be unaffected by a change of frame. For instance, with the conventional “win-lose” 
frame, the condition for voting immediately coincides with the last inequality. For both frames, this 
implies  C B > . e  in contradiction with the infinitesimal value of ε. 
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information is imprecise6. Moreover, the assumption of total ignorance does a poor job in 
predicting turnout because it implicitly assigns a uniform probability of one-half to subjective 
decisiveness, which underscores the heterogeneity of individual behaviour.  
 
 
3. Can non-EU theories solve the paradox? 
Now, we ask whether non-EU theories provide a solution to the PNV. Indeed, prospect theory 
assumes an overweighting of small probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), and regret 
theory suggests that independent prospects be framed as actions with common states of the 
world. Thus these prominent non-EU theories satisfy either NC1 or NC2. However, third-
generation prospect theory satisfies both conditions. 
3.1. Regret theory 
Regret theory (Bell 1982; Loomes and Sudgen 1982) contends that people, when making a 
decision, anticipate the regret, and conversely the rejoicing, that their choice might generate 
after the resolution of uncertainty. Thus EU is modified by the addition of a regret/rejoicing 
function which relates possible outcomes of the chosen action to outcomes of the non chosen 
one.  The  regret/rejoicing  function  R  is  strictly  increasing  in  the  absolute  value  of  regret, 
positive for rejoicing and negative for regret, and such that  ( ) 0 0 = R . The expected regret 
from one choice is symmetric to the expected rejoicing from its alternative choice. Table II 
shows that an individual expects to experience regret C with probability  e - 1  if he decides to 
vote  and  to  experience  regret  ) ( C B R -   with  probability  e   if  he  decides  to  abstain.  He 
maximises the sum of his EU (table I) and expected regret/rejoicing (table II). 
 
Table II Anticipation of regret/rejoicing in the decision to vote (V) or abstain (A) 
  Pr state state 1 or 2 = - 1 e  Pr state 3 = e 
A  rejoicing: R(C)  regret:  ) ( B C R -  
V  regret: R( ) C -   rejoicing:  ) ( C B R -  
 
According to regret theory, an individual decides to vote if and only if: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 1 . > - - - + - - - + - B C R C B R C R C R C B e e e   (3) 
The  second  term  in  brackets  is  always  negative  and  the  third  term  in  brackets  is  always 
positive. Since only the latter is infinitesimal, the sum of the two bracketed terms must be 
negative in a large election with costs to vote. Hence, since it is not EU-rational to vote (i.e., 
0 < -C B e ),  it  cannot  be  rational  a  fortiori  to  vote  for  regret  theory;  and  the  PNV  is 
aggravated in comparison with EU. What goes on here is that regret theory satisfies NC1, but 
not  NC2.  Although  the  options  of  voting  and  abstention  are  perceived  as  actions  with  a 
decisive state, the probability of a decisive vote e  is not overestimated. 
3.2. Prospect theory 
We  use  indifferently  cumulative  prospect  or  rank-dependent  EU  theories  (Tversky  and 
Kahneman 1992, Quiggin 1982) which respect dominance and extend to elections with more 
than  two  candidates.  Both  theories  transform  probabilities  by  substituting  rank-dependent 
decision weights (which add up to one) for the expected percentage score of a candidate. 
States are ranked from worst to best, and aggregated if they yield a common outcome.  
                                                           
6 Indeed, the probability q of “winning if I don’t vote” measures my confidence in the expected score p for my 
preferred candidate; q is sharply increasing function of p in the vicinity of  5 . 0 = p . 
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In the two-candidate election case, the decision to vote will be simply determined by: 
  ( ) ( )B q w C B q w > - +e ,  (4) 
or: 
  ( ) ( ) [ ] C B q w q w > - +e   (5) 
Since  e  is infinitesimal in a large election, prospect theory solves the PNV if and only if 
( ) ( ) q w q w - +e  is of a higher order of magnitude than e  for all values of  q  in a non-empty 
interval. However, this requires a discontinuity of the weighting function  ) (r w  at all values of 
r in a non-empty set. Thus prospect theory cannot solve the PNV. For example, the weighting 
function  which  is  most  widespread  in  the  literature  assumes  overweighting  of  small 
probabilities and underweighting of large probabilities. It is illustrated by figure 1.  
 





0 q  q+ε
ε
w(q+ε) w(q)  
 
If this weighting function was adopted,  ( ) r w  would be continuous and might even increase 
more slowly than r in the vicinity of one-half, so that:  ( ) ( ) e e < - + r w r w . The PNV would 
then be aggravated by the use of prospect theory. The only cases in which prospect theory 
might predict voting concern values of r very close to 0 or 1, which contradicts intuition and 
empirical findings that closeness of election has a weak but positive effect on voter turnout7. 
Notice that we did not explicitly account for loss aversion: doing this would reinforce the 
PNV by increasing the cost of voting in utility terms (see (5)), since the latter is a loss. 
Prospect  theory  fails  to  solve  the  PNV  because  it  satisfies  NC1,  but  not  NC2.  ε  is  not 
significantly overestimated because, under the specific framing postulated by this theory, it 
will be aggregated with the much larger probability q of winning without voting. Casting a 
decisive ballot is not isolated as an act that may change defeat into victory. 
3.3. Third-generation prospect theory 
Third-generation prospect theory (PT3  - Schmidt et al., 2008)  was introduced recently to 
explain the preference reversal phenomenon and the disparity between selling and buying 
                                                           
7 Mueller (2003) contains a survey of studies bearing on this point, both on aggregate and individual data. 
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prices.  It maintains that all values are relative  to a reference point but innovates on PT1 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and PT2 (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) by assuming that the 
reference point need not be a sure outcome and may be a lottery. Thus, if RP is the reference 
point, the value of lottery V, for instance, would simply be v(V)-v(R), where v stands for a 
utility function. Note that the reference is neutral, with a value equal to 0. In the context of 
their paper, Schmidt et al., (2008) select the status quo 0 in choice situations. Doing this 
would merely replicate the negative conclusion holding for the earlier version of prospect 
theory.  Having  said  this,  it  is  natural  to take  either  lottery  V  or  A  as  the  reference  here. 
However, the so amended theory does not give a clue for choosing between the two, so that, 
quoting Wakker (2010, p. 241), “In the absence of a theory of reference points, hypotheses 
about their location have to be based on pragmatic heuristics in applications”. For instance, 
the  reference  could  be  simply  the  individual’s  decision  to  vote  or  to  abstain  in  the  last 
election.  In  light  of  the  indeterminacy  of  the  reference,  we  consider  here  these  two 
possibilities.  
Since all values are relative to the decision to vote or abstain, citizens who respect the PT3 
rule  will  perceive  voting  as  an  individual  act  which  can  turn  defeat  into  victory  if  their 
reference is to abstain, and abstention as an individual act which can turn victory into defeat if 
their reference is to vote. Thus, in contrast with PT1 and PT2, NC1 is verified by PT3 thanks 
to this specific frame. Moreover, being pivotal is perceived alternatively as a gain or as a loss 
depending on whether the reference was to abstain or to vote. This suggests that loss aversion 
may play a role here so that the loss aversion parameter λ (≥1) of prospect theory is worth 
considering explicitly.  Both insights are reported in table III.  
 
Table III Reference point and values of gains and losses in the decision to vote or abstain  
Reference point  Decision  Pr state state 1 or 2 = - 1 e  Pr state 3 = e 
A  No loss, no gain: 0  No loss, no gain: 0   
A  V  Loss:  C l -   Gain:  C B -  
A  Gain: C   Loss:  ( ) B C - l    
V  V  No loss, no gain: 0  No loss, no gain: 0 
 
According to PT3, an individual decides to vote if and only if: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) 


= > - - + -
= < - + -
A R if C w C B w







The PT3 rule of decision is conditional on the reference point and derived from equations (6). 
The two conditional rules are summarized in figure 2.  
Figure 2 shows that voter turnout is decreasing in the cost-benefit ratio C/B and increasing in 
the  relative  weight  of  casting  a  decisive  ballot  w(ε)/w(1-ε)  whereas  loss  aversion  has  a 
reference-dependent effect, positive if the reference is to vote and negative if the reference is 
to abstain. The negative effect of the cost-benefit ratio is rather obvious and was already 
predicted by EU and earlier versions of prospect theory. The reference-dependence of the loss 
aversion effect means that, in the present state of PT3, loss aversion alone cannot offer a 
reliable explanation for the PNV. Thus, the burden of the proof rests essentially on the extent 
of overweighting of small probabilities relative to large probabilities. Since prospect theory 
does  not  specify  the  weighting  function,  the  resolution  of  the  PNV  by  PT3  becomes  an 
empirical question.  
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To see this, let us take one of the most popular weighting functions in the PT literature, which 
is an inverse S-shaped weighting function suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1992): 
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Which leads to (8) 
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Probabilities  are  not  distorted  when  1 = h   (i.e. ( ) r r w = )  and  small  probabilities  are 
overweighted when η<1. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) have estimated  61 . = h  for gains and 
69 . = h   for  losses.  Later,  most  of  the  empirical  studies  using  this  function  have  obtained 
values between .56 and .748 (Neilson and Stowe, 2002, pages 35-36). It can be shown from 
figure 2 and (8) that voter participation rises with ε9 (and thus with p – see eq. (2)) and 
declines with η, that is, with the degree of overweighting of small probabilities10.  
The following example, under extremely tight competition ( 5 . 0 = p ) and with 10 Million 
voters,  will  illustrate  how  PT3  may  explain  the  voting  behaviour.  From  (2),  e   is  only 
0.019%. With (7) and the value estimated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992),  61 . = h , the 
probability weights in (6) are respectively .53% and 99.13%, both weights being different 
from 0.019% and 99.98%. We retain the usual value 2 for the loss aversion parameter λ. (6) 
predicts  a  voting  behaviour  if  52 . 94 / > C B ,  if  voting  is  the  reference  point.  If  A  is  the 
reference point, there is less chance that the citizen will vote since it requires 08 . 375 / > C B . 
In both cases, however, these thresholds are way above Bendor et al.’s (2003) central value: 
B/C=4. Thus, PT3 is not inconsistent with the PNV but requires stronger overweighting of 
very low probabilities than found in most empirical studies which have used the Tversky and 
                                                           

















































: always true since ε is infinitesimal.  
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Kahneman’s (1992) weighting function. For example, if we take a lower value for η, 0.4, (6) 
predicts voting if  C C B 40 . 16 / >  when the reference is to vote, and  59 . 62 / > C B  when the 
reference is to abstain.  
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
In the American presidential election which opposed George W. Bush to Al Gore in 2000, the 
margin of votes between the two candidates was extremely narrow and votes in Florida were 
presented ex post as being decisive. Tight elections of this kind have been observed in other 
democratic nations as well. For example, in Italy, Romano Prodi beat Silvio Berlusconi in 
2006 by a tiny difference of 0.07%. These rare events entertain the democratic belief that each 
vote matters and can be decisive. Indeed, if the probability to be decisive is infinitesimal, it is 
not zero. This difference is essential in a democracy and it legitimates the framing of the 
decision to vote in a large election.  
Rational citizens who bear a cost of voting must perceive voting as an act under individual 
control which can turn defeat into victory. Moreover, they must substantially overweight the 
probability of casting a decisive ballot.  
We  demonstrated  that  prospect  and  regret  theory,  which  are  the  most  cited  non-expected 
utility theories, both fail to predict rational voting because they respect either NC1 or NC2 but 
not  these  two  necessary  conditions  together.  However,  the  PNV  is  consistent  with  an 
amended version of third-generation prospect theory in which the reference is merely to vote 
or abstain. 
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